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 1 
Statues and Lumps 
Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence? 
Last week Matthew combined rare soils to create a massive lump of clay.  He named the 
lump of clay ‘Clayton’.  Arthur found the clay on the workbench just last night and shaped it into 
a beautiful statue of a winged woman.  He named the statue ‘Angel’ and gave it pride of place on 
the mantle, where it now sits.  Because clay statues sell so poorly, three days from now Arthur 
will take a bit of clay from the statue, replace it by a bit of lead of the same size and shape, and 
continue the process for a few hours until the clay making up Angel is entirely replaced by lead, 
finally throwing the clay into the garbage bin. 
In the study of material constitution, there is a great divide between those who think that 
multiple objects can occupy the same place at the same time — call them pluralists — and those 
who think such spatial coincidence is impossible — call them monists.1  The argument for 
pluralism is simple.  The lump of clay sat on the workbench last night but the statue did not.  The 
statue could not survive flattening, but the lump could.  Because the statue and the lump of clay 
have different temporal and modal properties, by Leibniz’s Law we conclude that the statue and 
the lump of clay are not identical. 
This paper defends pluralism against several arguments philosophers have given to the 
contrary.  All of these arguments are rooted in a simple equivocation, a conflation of identity 
with what people more commonly mean by ‘the same’.  Clarify the semantics and the 
metaphysical puzzles dissolve.  The argument philosophers think to be most damning claims that 
pluralists cannot explain an object’s sort since its sort supervenes on its physical properties.  To 
resolve this puzzle we must clarify the order of explanation between an object’s sort, its 
properties intrinsic to the current time, and its properties extrinsic to the current time.  Once we 
dissolve the purported problems with coincidence, what remains is not yet another implausible 
                                                
1 The terminology is Kit Fine’s (in conversation). 
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theory of material constitution flouting common sense but instead the elimination of any need to 
appeal to a ‘crazy metaphysic’ in the first place.2 
This paper has already mentioned, en passant, one argument in favor of coincident 
objects, that based on Leibniz’s Law and differences in temporal and modal properties.  No new 
argument for coincidence will be given, since my interest lies solely in showing that the 
arguments against coincidence are unfounded.  Moreover, my concern in this paper will be 
limited to the question of whether multiple objects can occupy the same place at a time, rather 
than the question of whether multiple objects can occupy the same place at all times.  The issues 
are related, and exploring the former issue will shed light on the latter issue, but resolving the 
latter question requires a more lengthy discussion of modality that is best handled separately.  To 
clarify the issue between pluralists and monists, and to set the stage for further arguments, I 
begin with some simple semantics. 
1. The Semantics of ‘The Same’ 
Common sense insists that there is one thing on the mantle and, similarly, that the lump 
of clay is a statue.  If Matthew talks about “this lump of clay that has been given such a beautiful 
form” and Arthur talks about “my statue that will some day be in the Louvre”, we would most 
naturally say they are both talking about the same thing, just as “the inventor of the bifocals” and 
“the first postmaster-general” are expressions referring to the same thing.  To get a better grip on 
what these common sense claims mean, consider a person who has been told about a mantle 
holding a statue made of clay, where this person thinks that the lump of clay ‘is’ a statue and that 
there is only ‘one’ object on the mantle.  Now let’s tell this person that the statue was created just 
this morning and that prior to that the lump of clay had been sitting in the garage for a week.  She 
will not be moved at all to change her view that there is only ‘one’ object, that the lump of clay 
‘is’ a statue, despite the fact that we have made explicit differences in their temporal properties.  
Next let’s tell her that the lump of clay is painted entirely white and the statue is unpainted.  Now 
she does see an inconsistency and will conclude that there are, after all, ‘two’ separate items on 
the mantle or that some other assumption she was making was mistaken. 
                                                
2 The expression is Thomson’s (1983, 210). 
 3 
Why when we tell of one sort of difference between the two objects does she retain her 
conviction that there is only one thing on the mantle, and yet when we tell of another sort of 
difference she feels forced to give up this conviction?  Perhaps she is not attending to the 
temporal difference between the statue and the piece of clay when we tell her that one was 
created just this morning while the other existed yesterday and, more generally, whenever we 
count everyday objects we somehow uniformly neglect this sort of information.  Or perhaps she 
doesn’t realize that differences in temporal properties, like differences in any other properties, 
entail that the things so differing are not the same.  In other words, by telling some sort of error 
theory, we can maintain the claim that one thing is properly said to be ‘the same’ as another only 
if they are alike not only in color and other properties had at that time but also in their histories.  
Instead, though, we might pursue a more charitable story and say that what she means in this 
context by ‘one’ and ‘is’ is not that the lump of clay and the statue couldn’t be two different 
objects or that at one time they were not or will not differ, but only that they currently are not 
different. 
Thus, I am proposing that, at least in many contexts, the expression 'the same' is not 
invoking absolute identity but a relation I will call 'sameness', where “x is the same as y at t” is 
true iff x and y are identical in all non-modal properties intrinsic to t.3  The same point carries 
over to sentences using expressions inter-definable with 'the same'.  For x and y to be ‘the same 
thing,’ for x to ‘be’ y, for there to be only ‘one’ thing, for there to be ‘a’ thing rather than ‘some’ 
things — all such quantifying expressions, at least in many contexts, operate relative to a time.4 
Understanding our natural language quantifiers in this way also sheds light on why 
people say what they do about hypothetical cases of fission and fusion.  Imagine that Al splits 
                                                
3 Just as a property p is intrinsic to an individual i iff i’s instantiating p does not entail anything about objects wholly 
distinct from i, so too a property p is intrinsic to a time t iff any individual’s instantiating p at t does not entail 
anything about how things are at times other than t.  What I am calling ‘properties intrinsic to a time’ or ‘temporally 
intrinsic properties’, Simons (1987, p. 229) calls “time-blinkered properties” and Chisholm (1976, ch. 3) calls 
properties that are not “rooted outside the times at which they are had.” 
4 Quine (1969, 32) called these “the cluster of interrelated devices in which quantification becomes central.” 
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like an amoeba to become Cal and Hal.  The untutored claim is that there was only one person 
before the fission, that there are now two after the fission, and yet that Al did not die but 
somehow lived on through Cal and Hal.  If our quantifiers are relativized to times, we can say 
that before the fission Cal and Hal were ‘one and the same’ person even though they differ in 
ways extrinsic to that time and, thus, are now ‘two’ people. 
This interpretation of ‘the same’ will, no doubt, strike many as odd.5  But let us keep in 
mind that so many of the simplest predicates of English are temporally relative.  Being big, bent, 
                                                
5 So far I have suggested that often the relation picked out by ‘the same’ holds relative to a single time.  But how, 
then, can we say that b at t1 is the same as c at t2.  That is, there doesn’t seem to be any means of having a cross-
temporal relation whereby b and c are ‘the same.’  Yet, some may insist, everyday English clearly allows such talk:  
“I am the same person who waved to you yesterday.”  Likewise, “Angel, the statue standing here now, and Clayton, 
the lump of clay created last week, are the very same thing.”  How can we accommodate such sentences with a 
relation that only relates things at a single time? 
There are two answers one might give.  First, since I am only claiming that some utterances of ‘the same’ invoke 
sameness, we might simply agree that these problematic utterances invoke absolute identity rather than sameness.  
However, I think these utterances can be explained using the sameness relation as well, for while the sameness 
relation does not span times, the things related typically do.  The sentence “I am the same person who waved to you 
yesterday” claims that sameness obtains now between the referent of ‘I’ and the referent of ‘the person who waved 
to you yesterday’, though these things that are now related by sameness certainly have features obtaining at other 
times, e.g. the latter’s waving to you yesterday.  Of course, I and the person who waved to you yesterday are 
absolutely identical, so they are also related by sameness at all times at which they exist, but perhaps the sentence is 
only asserting sameness at a time, something weaker than absolute identity.  Similarly, Angel and Clayton are now 
‘the same,’ though it is also true that Clayton is that which was created last week.  Clayton has persisted through 
time: last week it was created, but now it is ‘the same’ as Angel; moreover, next week it will no longer be ‘the same’ 
as Angel.  Thus, a statement claiming that two things ‘are’ the same can be understood as predicating sameness now 
even if it identifies the relata in terms of properties they have at past or future times.  (And, likewise, statements can 
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wrinkled, green, smelly, hot, etc. are all properties intrinsic to a time.  In addition, intuitively it 
seems that counting the number of objects now on the mantle only requires examining the 
current state of affairs on the mantle, rather than determining what did, what will, or what could 
have happened to what’s on the mantle.  Thus, employing a sameness relation that holds merely 
in virtue of the properties things have intrinsic to the relevant time is very natural.  In fact, if 
pluralists are correct, then absolute identity would often be quite impractical for everyday use.  
Our concerns are not with the number of temporally and modally distinguished objects there are 
on the mantle, a quite confusing multitude, but with the number of objects as individuated by 
their physical properties at the time in question — a number which tells us how much dusting, 
packing, and insuring is required.6 
One might conclude from data such as this, following Myro (1986) or Gallois (1990; 
1998), that identity is temporally relative.  But all that has been suggested so far is that a common 
notion of x and y being numerically ‘the same’ is temporally relative.  Whether we want to say 
that identity itself is temporally relative depends upon what we mean by ‘identity,’ calling for 
further semantic investigation.  In everyday speech, ‘identical’ typically means qualitative 
identity rather than numerical identity.  To the extent that ‘identical’ is used to express something 
stronger in everyday language, its use usually parallels that of ‘the same’ that we have been 
investigating.  Sometimes, though, and especially in philosophical contexts, we mean something 
different than this temporally relative use of ‘the same’ and ‘identical.’  This stronger sense of 
‘the same’ and ‘identical’ invokes a relation characterized by Leibniz’s Law where b and c are 
‘identical’ only if b and c have exactly the same properties, including temporally extrinsic and 
                                                                                                                                                       
predicate sameness at past or future times even if they identify the relata in terms of properties they have at other 
times: “My uncle, who is now in Chicago, was the one who called you yesterday.”) 
6 Consider a case in which our practical concerns did ride on temporal differences.  If it became common practice to 
replace the material making up a statue, then insurance companies would take greater pains to specify whether it is 
this statue, the gold of which it is made, or both that are insured against theft. 
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modal properties.7  According to this notion of ‘identity’, what I will call ‘absolute identity’, the 
lump of clay and the statue are not identical, at least assuming they have the temporal and modal 
properties that common sense seems to ascribe to them. 
The sort of distinction I am highlighting is not unprecedented.  If White (1986) and Rea 
(1998) are right, Aristotle also distinguished a temporally and modally relative sameness relation 
from identity.  Of contemporary philosophers, Wiggins (1980), Johnston (1992), Thomson 
(1998), and Baker ( 1997) distinguish the ‘is’ of identity from the ‘is’ of composition.  It is true, 
they would urge, that the statue is the clay, but this means merely that the statue is composed of 
the clay, where this relation is to be understood as temporally relativized.  The idea seems to be 
that occasionally we employ forms of ‘to be’ with a special compositional meaning that applies 
to material objects.  I would go further, though, and insist that the meaning is not all that special 
— it is not specifically about composition of material objects but is a more general notion simply 
got by relativizing absolute identity to a time.  Moreover, I say that the distinction comes not just 
with forms of ‘to be’ but with all English quantifiers and, perhaps even, that this is not an 
optional way we can use our quantifiers but how our quantifiers always operate in tensed 
contexts.8  Perry (1970, 198-199), Robinson (1985), and Lewis (1986, 218; 1976, 63) distinguish 
two ways in which we count things.  According to one way, the statue and the lump of clay are 
two things, for they differ temporally.  According to the other, the statue and the lump of clay are 
                                                
7 Gibbard argues that modal predicates do not pick out modal properties, and thus x and y being identical does not 
require that x and y satisfy the same modal predicates.  Since I am defending pluralism, rather than attacking 
monism, I will not discuss Gibbard’s views. 
8 It seems we need some sort of non-relativized quantifier use to account for sentences in which we count objects 
that do not exist at the same time, as when we say that there are forty-three people that have become the president of 
the U.S.  (Thanks to Ted Sider and Kit Fine, who steered me to these problematic cases.)  We can’t say that our 
quantifiers are non-relativized iff they are in tensed sentences, for we also say things such as: In 1977 there were 
thirty-seven people who had become president.  Thus, if there is some general explanation of when our quantifiers 
are relativized, the story will have to be more complicated, perhaps along the lines of whether the tense operator 
governs the quantifier. 
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one thing, for to count in this way is to count by identity-at-t, i.e. in a temporally relative way.  
But, again, I want to generalize the point, this time insisting it is not merely how we count but 
how all our quantifiers work.  And though Lewis (1976, 64) claims that prior to fission Al “is 
really two nonidentical persons,” I see no reason to think this temporal relativization is not part 
of the semantics for quantifiers and, likewise, no reason to deny that Al is really one person. 
I therefore see the distinction between absolute identity and sameness as applying more 
widely and being more fundamental than other proponents see it.  My aim in this paper, 
however, is not so much to establish the distinction but to set out how this ambiguity lies at the 
root of the puzzle of coincidence.  Thus, even if I don’t convince the reader that ‘the same’ is 
typically temporally relative, and that recognizing this semantic fact allows us to preserve what 
common sense has to say about coincident objects, I hope at least to show that, contrary to the 
current perception, the arguments marshaled against pluralism share a controversial assumption 
and, thus, that the case against pluralism consists not of several different arguments but of a 
single undefended view about the semantics of our everyday quantifiers. 
With the distinction between sameness and absolute identity in hand, let me clarify the 
issue of this paper.  The question is whether multiple objects can coincide.  By ‘coincidence’ I 
mean spatial coincidence, or the occupying of exactly the same place at the same time.  By 
‘multiple’ I mean more than one as individuated by absolute identity.  Monists claim that the 
statue and the lump of clay are absolutely identical, while pluralists claim that they are not.9 
That said, I now turn to the various reasons that have been given for thinking that the 
statue and the lump of clay are absolutely identical. 
                                                
9 One might object that I am in fact defending monism since I argue that the semantics for our quantifiers that is 
most commonly relevant in everyday contexts is temporally relative and in this sense there is only one thing on the 
mantle.  Because I am claiming that many have failed to distinguish two ways of quantifying, neither ‘monist’ nor 
‘pluralist’ is a label that neatly fits my position.  Both those denying and those endorsing the possibility of ‘multiple’ 
objects coinciding are partially correct, I say.  However, I have characterized my position as pluralist because I think 
the key issue is whether the objects are identical, not merely ‘the same’ in the looser, everyday sense.  My concern, 
though, is whether the relativization of our quantifiers to times explains puzzles of coincidence, not which label we 
wish to give to this view. 
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2. Reason 1: The Intuition That There’s One Object 
In our examination of the semantics of ‘the same’, we have already considered one 
reason cited in favor of monism, viz., the pre-theoretic intuition that only one object sits upon the 
mantle.  And quite a few philosophers have been motivated towards monism on this basis.10  As 
Lewis (1986, 218) says, “It seems for all the world that there is only one.”  But as our little 
semantic study suggests, this is a claim that carries no cross-temporal or cross-modal force.  
Using a relation of absolute identity we can make finer distinctions, so what we may correctly 
judge to be ‘one’ object when employing temporally relativized quantifiers are ‘multiple’ objects 
when employing non-relativized quantifiers.  This is merely to say that the statue and the lump of 
clay do not differ in any ways intrinsic to this moment and world, though we can distinguish 
them when considering their properties extrinsic to this moment and world.  The putative conflict 
between pluralism and intuition is thus nothing more than a conflation of the two notions of 
being ‘the same thing’.  The pluralist is not denying that the statue and the lump of clay are 
related by sameness, only that they are absolutely identical. 
3. Reason 2: Two Things Cannot Occupy the Same Place at the Same Time 
According to Wiggins (1968, 90), “It is a truism frequently called in evidence and 
confidently relied upon in philosophy that two things cannot be in the same place at the same 
time.”11  This, then, is a second reason cited in favor of monism.  For it has seemed to many that 
we will have to flout this common sense principle if we are to say that the statue and the clay are 
not identical.12 
Heller (1990, 14) explains away some putative counter-examples to the common sense 
dictum by noting that these are cases of partial identity.13  Though the oak tree and one of its 
                                                
10See Myro (1986, 148-9); Rea (2000, 169); van Inwagen (1990, 127); Lewis (1986, 218; 1988, 71); cf. Robinson, 
(1982, 320); and Thomson (1998, 149). 
11Wiggins is here reporting a common view, though not his own. 
12See Zimmerman (1997, 19); van Inwagen (1981, 129); Burke (1994, 237); Sider (1996, 446); Doepke (1982, 10). 
13Cf. Lewis (1993, 177ff). 
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branches occupy the same place at the same time, this is because they are partially identical, i.e. 
because the part of the tree that coincides with the branch just is that branch.  Thus, we can 
reconcile some putative counter-examples with the principle that two things can’t occupy the 
same place by taking the principle to mean two wholly distinct things cannot coincide.  However, 
this doesn’t seem to save the pluralist, who is trying to distinguish the statue and the lump of 
clay, for since the statue and the lump of clay are made of exactly the same atoms, it is hard to 
say that one is merely partially identical to the other.  Prima facie, every part that belongs to the 
statue also belongs to the lump of clay.14 
We can make progress, though, by recalling that what we usually mean by ‘the same’ and 
‘one’ are relations based upon sameness rather than absolute identity.  Understood in this light, 
the truism Wiggins cites is merely claiming that ‘two things’, i.e. something x and something y 
differing in their temporally intrinsic properties, cannot occupy the same place at the same time.  
Thus understood, the truism does not conflict with the possibility of there being absolutely ‘two 
things’, i.e., something x and something y differing in their temporally extrinsic or modal 
properties, occupying the same place at the same time.  The lump of clay sits upon the mantle.  
The statue also sits there.  But because the statue and the lump of clay are identical in all of their 
properties intrinsic to the current moment, they are (currently) ‘one’ and ‘the same’ thing and 
therefore do not constitute a counter-example to the claim that two things can’t occupy the same 
place at the same time. 
                                                
14 Of course, a temporal part theorist would disagree with my reasoning by insisting that temporal parts are parts, 
thus locating the partial identity of the statue and the lump of clay with the temporal slices at the time in question 
and their partial distinctness with slices at other times.  The way I am suggesting we reconcile the common sense 
dictum with pluralism is, in effect, similar to this sort of appeal to temporal parts in that we both disqualify putative 
counterexamples by claiming that they are not identical things merely in virtue of being identical in all ways 
intrinsic to the time in question.  However, temporal parts theorists will claim that the putative counterexamples are 
cases of two things that are not ‘wholly distinct’, while I claim that they are not ‘two’ things in the relevant sense, 
i.e. the sense intended by the common sense claim that two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time.  
See Heller (1990, 14-15). 
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Pluralists, seeking to explain away the conflict with the common sense dictum, have tried 
to re-interpret the dictum.  For example, Wiggins concludes that we must limit the principle to 
apply only to “two things of the same kind”.  Heller (1992, 695), following a common temporal 
parts strategy, claims that “A physical object is the material content of a region of spacetime.”  
Thus, he claims that the statue and the lump of clay are partially identical, coinciding in their 
temporal parts.  But surely these approaches misinterpret what people have in mind.  They are 
denying, e.g., that the baseball can pass through the bat.  That is, the common sense dictum is a 
simple denial that material objects can spatially overlap, whether or not they are of the same sort 
and whether or not they overlap for merely part of their lives.15  The statue and the lump of clay 
are — i.e., currently are — the same thing, so they do not constitute a counter-example to the 
common dictum.  A ball passing through the bat, on the other hand, would provide a counter-
example since the ball and the bat (or even the parts of the ball and bat that exactly coincide) are 
two things, i.e., things differing in their temporally intrinsic properties: the ball is made of yarn 
while the bat is made of wood. 
4. Reason 3: Rampant Creation and Destruction 
Van Inwagen (1990, 126) raises a third reason for thinking that the statue and the lump of 
clay are identical.  Something is said to be a statue, he argues, in virtue of its shape.  Yet it seems 
there is nothing metaphysically special about the shapes in virtue of which something is a statue, 
so we can with equal right consider another sort of object — call it a ‘gollyswoggle’ — which is 
                                                
15 Heller claims that physical objects have their boundaries essentially.  It therefore appears that he in fact is not 
identifying objects with the material content of a region, at least as we ordinarily individuate material content.  And 
it therefore seems that Heller cannot capture the common sense dictum.  It is conceivable that two people or two 
quarks, e.g., could pass through each other, such that they both occupy the same exact spatial region at the same 
time, though retaining their own identities throughout.  This explains why we picture ghosts passing through walls 
and why we wonder if magicians can make a coin pass through a piece of wood.  This suggests that common sense 
takes itself to be making a contingent claim in saying that two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time.  
Yet if we cash out the dictum using Heller’s hunks, the claim becomes tautologous: two hunks that occupy the same 
space at the same time ipso facto are partially identical. 
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a gollyswoggle in virtue of it having some different shape, e.g. the shape I accidentally created 
just now from the clay.  “But if you can make a gollyswoggle by accident by kneading clay, then 
you must, as you idly work the clay in your fingers, be causing the generation and corruption of 
the members of a compact series of objects of infinitesimal duration.  That is what seems to me 
to be incredible.”16 
There are three problems with van Inwagen’s argument.  First, it is hard to see why an 
appeal to intuition should favor his view, viz. that the only things that exist are simples and 
organisms, over the view that material objects coincide.  Intuition says that lumps and statues do 
exist, and intuition says that Michelangelo did create something when he shaped the lump of clay 
so beautifully.  And while it does seem that when one considers the jostling collection of atoms 
making up the statue, there is nothing metaphysically special about this collection of atoms over 
any other collection of jostling atoms, I also find it hard to see what would be so special, 
metaphysically, about the collection of jostling atoms making up an organism. 
Second, it seems that van Inwagen’s objection can be answered by a fairly 
straightforward pragmatic story.  Van Inwagen is right to say that as Michelangelo crafts the clay 
into a human form we think a single new thing has been created rather than a great multitude, 
and he is also correct that there is nothing special, metaphysically, about statue-shaped pieces of 
clay rather than gollyswoggle-shaped pieces.  But this suggests that our intuition that only a 
single thing was created rests upon a distinction dealing with what things are relevant to the 
discussion.  If we discovered that the shape of a gollyswoggle is the exact shape necessary to 
cause the angels to sing, and therefore many people wanted to make gollyswoggles, then we 
would begin to think of this shape as especially relevant and we would think that in shaping the 
clay in just that way we had created a new thing.  In other words, the intuitions to which van 
Inwagen appeals indicate that judgments about what things exist or what new things have been 
created are guided by perceptions of relevance.  Thus, in such questions it seems we can let any 
possible shape count as a new object, though which things we are willing to countenance in a 
particular context is simply a matter of pragmatics restricting our quantifiers. 
                                                
16Sosa (1999, 133) takes a similar position. 
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A third problem with van Inwagen’s argument is that it too rests upon an ambiguity of 
tense.  When we consider the new gollyswoggle that has been created, we might be drawn by the 
intuition that, as van Inwagen suggests, we have not created some new object but have merely 
given the same old lump of clay a new shape.  What exists after the reshaping is still just the 
lump of clay and not a new thing.  And, of course, in some sense, this is entirely correct.  But we 
have already seen the sense in which it is and the sense in which it is not correct.  For if we 
consider how many different things there are in the temporally relative sense, then the 
gollyswoggle and the lump of clay are the very same thing — the gollyswoggle is not a single 
atom more or less than the lump of clay, so nothing new has been created.  But if we consider 
what is there in the absolute sense, individuating things by their temporal and modal properties, 
then we have something that differs, temporally and modally, from the lump of clay.  In short, 
van Inwagen’s argument rides on the same ambiguity of sameness and identity that we have 
already explored. 
5. Reasons 4, 5, & 6: Relations between properties 
The fourth reason for thinking the statue and the lump of clay are identical is that this is 
the best explanation of why they have such similar properties.  As Thomson (1998, 150) argues, 
they “plainly stand in some intimate relation to each other—they currently occupy the same 
place, they currently have the same shape, size, color, texture, smell, and so on and on.  In what 
relation do they stand to each other if not identity?” 
Zimmerman (1995, 87) considers his body and its constituting mass, each of which 
weighs 140 pounds.  If these are different objects, he wonders, “how can it be so easy to lift both 
these 140-pound physical objects at once?”  Lewis (1986, 252-3) says “It reeks of double 
counting to say that here we have a dishpan, and we also have a dishpan-shaped bit of plastic that 
is just where the dishpan is, weighs just what the dishpan weighs (why don’t the two together 
weigh twice as much?), and so on.  This multiplication of entities is absurd on its face; and it 
only obfuscates the matter if we say that the plastic and the dishpan are ‘relatively identical’ 
while implying that they are absolutely not identical.”17  That two coincident things don’t weigh 
                                                
17Lewis is actually offering this argument for the case in which the dishpan and the piece of plastic are spatio-
temporally coincident.  But notice how the same argument, drawing on the same intuitions, works equally well in 
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twice as much (or occupy twice as much space, or cost twice as much, etc.) is thus the fifth 
reason for thinking them identical. 
Rea (2000,174), giving what he takes to be a common reason for denying coincidence, 
says that the statue and the lump of clay “cannot be distinct because they share all of the same 
parts and (we assume) for any x and y, if x and y share all of the same parts, x = y.”18  This is the 
sixth reason for thinking the statue and the lump of clay are identical. 
Using such reasons, monists argue that there are strange connections between the 
properties of the statue and the properties of the lump of clay — whether it be having identical 
weights, having weights that don’t combine additively, or having all the same parts — which are 
best explained by the objects being identical.  Of course, when we talk about the properties they 
‘have’, this is meant as a tensed predication.  The statue and the lump of clay weigh the same at 
t, the time under consideration.  Similarly, their weights combine non-additively at t, and they 
share all the same ultimate parts at t.  But after the clay is replaced by lead, then they will not 
weigh the same, their weights will combine additively, and they will not share any parts.  In 
short, the argument gives us reason not to think that the statue and the lump of clay are 
absolutely identical but only that they are identical in all ways intrinsic to a particular moment.  
And this, of course, is exactly what we have recognized with our ambiguity.  In other words, 
Thomson, Zimmerman, and Rea have merely given us reasons for thinking the statue and the 
lump of clay are ‘the same’, where this is understood as a temporally relative relation of 
sameness, but not for thinking that they are absolutely identical. 
                                                                                                                                                       
the case of spatial coincidence as well.  In both cases our intuitions seem to require a denial of Leibniz’s Law, so 
why in the temporal case does Lewis (1986, 218) deny these intuitions and say “We will have to say something 
counter-intuitive,” and in the modal case say that whoever denies these intuitions is ‘obfuscating the matter’?  Since 
these are parallel arguments, a parallel explanation is surely desirable. 
18This is not an argument Rea himself endorses (Rea, in correspondence).  Johnston (1992, § 2) takes a similar line.  
See also Robinson (1982, 323). 
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6. Reason 7: Supervenience and the Physical 
Of the many reasons for thinking the statue and the lump of clay are identical, one has 
emerged as the challenge for pluralists.  The same general sort of argument against coincidence 
has been supported by Heller (1990, 30-32), Zimmerman (1995), Burke (1992; 1980), van 
Inwagen (1990, 290n45), Sosa (1987, 78-82), Olson (2001), and Bennett (forthcoming) to name 
a few.19  There are both temporal and modal versions of the argument, but since we are 
concerned here with spatial coincidence rather than spatio-temporal coincidence, only the former 
will be considered.  The general argument, here in Burke’s (1992, 14-15) words, begins with an 
explanatory challenge: 
In virtue of what does the object identified under ‘statue’ satisfy ‘statue’?  In virtue of what does the object 
identified under ‘piece of copper’ satisfy ‘piece of copper’?  Given the qualitative identity of these objects, 
what explains their alleged difference in sort? 
Burke goes on to argue that pluralists cannot explain an object’s sort by its history.  I disagree.  
Before presenting my argument, though, I’d like to try to understand the thinking underlying 
Burke’s challenge. 
Burke (1992, 14) begins his challenge pointing out that Angel and Clayton “are 
qualitatively identical.  Indeed, they consist of the very same atoms.  What, then, could make 
them different in sort?”  Burke means this as a tensed claim, saying that Angel and Clayton are 
currently qualitatively identical.  But do a thing’s current physical properties determine its 
sort?20  One might find this position tempting by considering how we in fact do identify a thing’s 
sort.  For example, Burke (1992, 14n4) explains how the monist can meet the explanatory 
challenge he is laying down: “On theories that allow only one object to a place, differences in 
sort are readily explained.  The difference in sort between a tree and a mouse is attributable to 
the difference in their qualities.”  The tree and the coinciding quantity of cellular matter 
presumably provide a contrast case, for they are indistinguishable, and therefore, runs the 
objection, what current properties could possibly explain why one is a tree and the other not? 
                                                
Rea presents and then attacks a supervenience argument.  See also Levey (1997). 
20By ‘current properties’ I mean non-modal properties intrinsic to the current moment. 
 15 
Pluralists can protest that while the two are currently indistinguishable, they are not 
indistinguishable simpliciter.  The monist, however, may press his point: “But it’s intuitively 
obvious that what makes this object a tree is just the way it is, not the way it was, will be, or 
could have been.  Just by examining the bark, the leaves, the sap, etc. we know that this thing is a 
tree.”   The monist’s claims here are intuitively correct, but that is because we are considering 
‘an’ object as individuated at a time — in this case the present time — by its temporally intrinsic 
non-modal properties and thus we are distinguishing the tree from the mouse and the bison but 
we are abstracting away from differences between the tree and the collection of atoms which 
constitute the tree.  Thus, the fact that we commonly do use only temporally intrinsic properties 
to draw certain distinctions is no reason to think that there are not further distinctions to be made 
between, e.g., the tree and the coincident collection of cellulose molecules. 
Some monist accounts are rooted in the observation that when asked “What is it?” we say 
it is a tree, and we don’t say it is a collection of cellulose molecules.  Thus, goes the thinking, we 
are distinguishing trees from collections of cellulose molecules and saying that the single object 
is a tree — or, perhaps, is essentially a tree.  The difficulty with this story, however, is that our 
answer to the “What is it?” question can vary with context.  Thus, a much more plausible story is 
that we answer such questions by providing the most informative answer given the context.  In 
most circumstances the best answer is perhaps ‘a tree’, though for those shopping for a 
Christmas tree ‘a Monterey Pine’ is more appropriate and for the hungry Martian who can digest 
only cellulose molecules but is unconcerned with the differences between bales of hay, pieces of 
paper, and trees, ‘a collection of cellulose molecules’ is best.  It therefore seems that the 
intuitively compelling thought that we need not appeal to historical properties to explain 
something’s sort comes from the natural way of individuating things by sameness.  We say there 
is one thing here, and it is a tree, because we are individuating by temporally intrinsic properties 
and we’re supplying the most pragmatically useful answer as to its sort, i.e. what, given the 
context, we might call its ‘dominant kind’.21 
                                                
21 I am gesturing at the ‘Dominant Kinds’ account offered by Burke and Rea, suggesting that the intuition 
underlying such an account relies upon our consideration of objects as individuated by sameness.  See Burke (1994) 
and Rea (2000). 
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6.1 The Charge of Circularity 
I suspect the argument we have examined plays a part in motivating many monist 
accounts and Burke’s in particular.22  But in Burke’s case it is unclear, for in the same footnote in 
which Burke (1992, 14n4) explains how monists can meet the explanatory challenge, he 
continues as follows: 
In the extraordinary case in which the objects differing in sort are qualitatively identical (as in Peter 
Simons’ case of genuine bills and counterfeit bills . . . or the case of a statue and a qualitatively identical 
object produced by a volcano), the difference in sort is explained by differences in the manner or 
circumstances of their origin or, perhaps, by other differences in their histories. 
But, claims Burke, though the monist can explain an object’s sort by its history, pluralists can’t.  
The difficulty, according to Burke (1992, 15), is that the pluralist’s account of an object’s 
history, or cross-temporal identity, would have to appeal to the object’s sort, thereby making the 
account circular. 
. . . now what could account for a difference in the cross-time identities of [Angel and Clayton]?  The two 
are composed of just the same atoms.  And since they are coextensive, any object spatiotemporally 
continuous with one is spatiotemporally continuous with the other.  If one but not the other is identical with 
a certain past or future object, the only apparent explanation for this is that one but not the other is like that 
object in sort.  In short, historical differences between [Angel and Clayton] could be explained only by 
reference to the very difference they are themselves supposed to explain: the alleged difference in sort. 
Note, though, that as the problem is stated, many monists will likewise have trouble 
giving a non-circular account.  For example, consider a statue that was yesterday formed from 
clay and next week will be squashed.  According to Burke’s (1994) own account, the statue is a 
lump, i.e. is identical to a lump, but it is distinct from the original lump from which the statue 
                                                
22 Why would Burke see the appeal to the object’s history as necessary only in ‘the extraordinary case’ if the line of 
reasoning I have given is not at least underlying Burke’s thinking?  As an analogy, consider the following:  We can 
explain why objects x and y differ by appealing to their differences in properties.  Admittedly, only in the 
extraordinary case need we appeal to anything other than the differences in the exact times they exist, but it would 
be strange to mention this unless one thought that times of existence were somehow special in determining the 
difference between objects.  Similarly, Burke’s thought that we can explain an object’s sort at t by its properties 
intrinsic to t except in the extraordinary case suggests that he thinks the properties intrinsic to t are somehow doing 
more important work in determining the object’s sort. 
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was made.  At the moment the original lump was given the intended shape yesterday, it ceased to 
exist and a spatio-temporally continuous lump, which is a statue as well as a lump of clay, came 
into existence.  Thus, on Burke’s account the situation I would describe as containing (at least) 
two objects instead consists of a single object, which is both a statue and a lump of clay, that is 
not cross-temporally identical to the single object, which is merely a lump of clay, that will exist 
after the squashing.  But we can consider a second situation that is the same as the first in all 
respects from the present moment forward although yesterday instead of the clay being 
intentionally given a form it accidentally acquired that shape when it rolled off the workbench 
and banged into a series of tools.  According to Burke’s account this second situation currently 
consists of a single object, which is a lump of clay but not a statue, that is cross-temporally 
identical with the single object, which is only a lump of clay, that will remain after the 
squashing.  How can Burke account for the difference in identity across time between what sits 
before us in the first situation and what sits before us in the second situation if not by appealing 
to their sorts?  It seems his account fails his own challenge.23  But rather than a tu quoque 
showing that something is wrong with Burke’s argument, let’s try to pinpoint what is wrong. 
                                                
23 Burke’s challenge consists of a single situation which, according to the pluralist, contains two objects; thus Burke 
asks for an account of the difference in the identity across time of the two objects.  My challenge in response 
consists of two situations, each of which, according to Burke’s account, contains a single object; thus I ask for an 
account of the difference in the identity across time of these two objects.  Because Burke’s challenge involves two 
objects in a single situation, an explanation of their differences in identity across time can only appeal to differences 
in the objects themselves.  My challenge, in contrast, involves two situations, leaving open the possibility that the 
differences in the objects’ identity across time might instead be due to differences in the situations other than 
differences in the objects.  However, the only differences between the two situations lie in the past.  Thus, Burke 
might respond by saying that he can explain the difference in identity over time between the two objects by 
appealing to the different circumstances surrounding the shaping of the two objects.  But the idea behind Burke’s 
challenge seems to be that if this thing existing now is identical across time with that thing existing later, but 
something else existing now is not, then the explanation of the difference must come from facts about what obtains 
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Burke’s argument centers upon the statue’s so-called ‘cross-time identity’.  However, this 
is an ambiguous expression.  By ‘cross-time identity’ Burke might mean simply identity, perhaps 
restricting our attention to cases where we pick out the relata by means of properties they have at 
different times.  If identity is the relation intended by ‘cross-time identity’, then expressions 
describing the relata of this relation, such as ‘the statue that will sit on the mantle next week’, 
must be talking about the object — in this case the statue.  
Thus, Burke might be talking about identity and about Angel, asking for an explanation 
of why Angel (i.e., the statue sitting here now) is identical to Angel (i.e., the statue that will sit 
on the mantle next week) whereas Clayton (i.e., the lump of clay sitting here now) is not.  But if 
we’re talking about why the identity relation holds between these relata, there is really nothing to 
explain. For we cannot explain the identity of Angel with itself other than to repeat that it is the 
same, i.e. identical, thing being considered as both relata.24  The first relatum is sitting here now 
and will sit on the mantle next week; likewise for the second relatum since the first relatum just 
is the second relatum.  Thus, if we’re talking about the referent of ‘the statue sitting here now’ 
and the referent of ‘the statue that will sit on the mantle next week’ — rather than about the 
properties in virtue of which we pick out these referents — we’re not really starting with any 
difference between the two that would invite an explanation of their identity. 
This is one reason to think that Burke’s request for an explanation of the ‘cross-time 
identities’ of Angel and Clayton isn’t asking for an explanation of why Angel bears the identity 
relation with certain objects whereas Clayton doesn’t.  An even better reason is that identity 
doesn’t fit what Burke says about ‘cross-time identity’.  For example, Burke claims that the 
pluralist’s explanation of the cross-time identity of various objects would have to appeal to their 
sorts.  It is natural to think that we must appeal to an object’s sort to explain its history, but not to 
explain their identities.  If Angel is identical to itself but not to Clayton or to Michelangelo’s 
David, how could the sort of these objects explain this fact?  Moreover, identity is not really a 
                                                                                                                                                       
now, then, or, perhaps, sometime in between.  I therefore don’t see how Burke can take advantage of the fact that my 
challenge involves two situations rather than one. 
24See Lewis (1986, 192-3).  Sider (1999) also makes this point.  Cf. Lowe (1989, esp.  12-13) and Jubien (1996). 
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cross-time or historical relation.  The object spans times, but not the identity relation between an 
object and itself. 
It therefore seems much more plausible that what Burke means by ‘cross-time identity’ is 
not a relation between an object and itself but a relation between things that exist at different 
times.  There are various ways to cash this out to get at the desired relation.  The simplest way is 
to use talk of temporal parts.  Thus, when Burke talks of a statue x existing at t and a statue y 
existing at t’ being cross-time identical, this can be rephrased as talk of the temporal slice at t of 
statue x and the temporal slice at t’ of statue y being temporal slices of a single thing.  Or, in 
other words, this can be understood as talk of two temporal slices bearing a genidentity relation 
R to each other. 
For those like Burke who deny the existence of arbitrary temporal parts we can instead 
make use of property instantiations.  Coincident objects will instantiate the same non-modal 
properties that are intrinsic to that time.  If Angel weighed three stone at noon, so too did 
Clayton.  If Clayton is now shiny, so too is Angel.  Thus, the instantiation of a property intrinsic 
to a time will form an equivalence class with instantiations of the same property at the same time 
by coincident objects.  Let’s say that when an object instantiates a set of properties intrinsic to a 
time it ‘exhibits’ the set of equivalence classes of property instantiations formed from that set.  
These equivalence classes allow us to abstract away from differences between coincident objects 
at a time.  Thus, the question of whether the statue x at t and the statue y at t’ are cross-
temporally identical can be rephrased as the question of whether the set of equivalence classes of 
property instantiations which statue x exhibits that are intrinsic to t and the set of property 
instantiations which statue y exhibits that are intrinsic to t’ are sets of equivalence classes of 
property instantiations exhibited by a single thing.  Or, in other words, this can be understood as 
talk of two sets of property instantiations bearing a genidentity relation R’ to each other.  We can 
ask the same question and give the same answer with or without talk of temporal parts, but 
because present concerns do not ride on the controversial commitments of temporal parts, I will 
continue to use temporal parts talk for convenience. 
Perhaps, then, Burke’s challenge to “account for a difference in the cross-time identities 
of [Angel and Clayton]” is asking for an explanation of why certain temporal slices are 
genidentical to some but not to others.  After all, this is what problems dealing with ‘persistence 
conditions’ or so-called ‘identity through time’ are all about.  Moreover, in this case we are 
asking about the difference in histories of the objects and it does seem that we might need to 
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appeal to the objects’ sorts to explain their different histories.  Construing Bruke’s questions 
about ‘cross-time identity’ in this way, he would be asking for an explanation of why the current 
slice of the statue is genidentical to the temporal slice next week of the statue whereas the current 
slice of the lump of clay is not.  But in this case we don’t get the asymmetry that Burke suggests.  
The current temporal slice of the statue sitting on the mantle is a slice of the same object as the 
future temporal slice of the statue that will sit on the mantle in one week.  But the current 
temporal slice of the lump of clay sitting on the mantle is also a slice of the same object as the 
future temporal slice of the statue that will sit on the mantle one week from now.  Why?  
Because the current temporal slice of the statue just is the current temporal slice of the lump of 
clay.25  There is only one current temporal slice at the time and location we are considering, so 
we can’t ask, as Burke seems to try to ask, why one bears some relation with something in the 
future that the other doesn’t bear.  Something has gone wrong. 
Burke’s argument draws upon a natural intuition that an object’s sort determines with 
which objects it is cross-temporally identical.  If asked where ‘this’ will be next week, it seems 
that we can only answer the question once we determine whether ‘this’ is referring to the statue 
or the lump of clay.  Thus, comes the conclusion, something’s sort determines its identity over 
time.  However, this line of reasoning confuses metaphysical with epistemic determinations.  As 
an analogy, consider Sue’s question of whether ‘this’, as she points to a spot on a plank of a ship, 
is identical across space with ‘that’, where she points to a spot on a different plank of the same 
ship, where context does not make clear to us whether ‘this’ and ‘that’ are intended to refer to the 
ship or to the planks of the ship.  Does the referent’s sort explain whether ‘this’ is identical with 
‘that’?  In some sense, yes.  Epistemically, we are unable to determine whether ‘this’ and ‘that’ 
are demonstratives referring to identical things unless we know the sort of the referents.  But this 
                                                
25 According to traditional temporal parts theory, the current slice of the statue is identical to the current slice of the 
lump of clay.  For those who believe in spatio-temporally coinciding objects, including slices, we can instead say 
that the current slice of the statue is identical in all non-modal respects to the current slice of the lump of clay.  For 
simplicity, I will usually talk as if the slices are identical, but the argument does not ride on this.  In either case, the 
current slice of the statue might bear a modal relation to some other slice that the current slice of the lump of clay 
does not bear, but they will bear all the same non-modal relations.  
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is simply because we are unable to fix upon the referents without first coming to know their 
sorts.  Metaphysically, however, whether ‘this’ and ‘that’ are identical is determined solely by 
the two referents, without any need to appeal to their sorts.  If ‘this’ refers to one plank and ‘that’ 
refers to another, then this and that are not identical; the reason they are not identical is not that 
they are planks but instead that they are different things.  If ‘this’ and ‘that’ refer to the ship, then 
ipso facto this and that are identical; again, this is not because of the sort involved but only 
because that which was referred to the first time just is that which was referred to the second 
time. 
Part of the intuitive appeal of Burke’s argument also comes from the suggestion that there 
is only a single relation of ‘identity through time’. Yet even Burke must allow that actually there 
are multiple genidentity relations since he thinks there are different sorts with different 
persistence conditions.  If something is a lump of clay and not a statue and something else is a 
statue, the conditions for two slices being slices of the same statue must therefore be different 
than the conditions for two slices being slices of the same lump of clay.  But this suggests that a 
single slice could be co-statue-slice related to one set of slices and be co-lump-slice related to a 
different set of slices.  The problem comes when we confuse this multitude of different 
genidentity relations with identity, for there is only one identity relation, which tempts us to 
conclude that there is only one identity across time relation and, equivocating, therefore only one 
set of slices to which the current slice of the statue can be related by ‘cross-time identity’. 
The conflation of the object with the temporal slice of the object is yet another symptom 
of the same conflation we saw earlier, that of sameness and absolute identity.  Burke’s argument 
leans heavily on the fact that the statue and the lump of clay are composed of the same atoms, are 
coextensive with the same things, and so forth, but notice that these are tensed claims talking 
about what the statue and the lump of clay are like now.  Because present tense and tenseless 
predications are homonymous, speaking of the way the statue is, or what properties it has, easily 
confuses what is now the case with what is absolutely the case.  As a result, it is quite natural to 
slide into thinking of “the statue now sitting on the mantle” as characterized by all of the 
properties it has, i.e. has now, and thus to have in mind actually the slice rather than the statue.  
But, as mentioned, as long as we’re restricting our thinking to the current temporal slice of the 
statue, then we cannot draw any conclusions about the identity of the statue or, more specifically, 
about how the statue is at other times. 
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In summary, when Burke asks how the statue can be identical across time with something 
to which the lump of clay is not identical across time, his question rides on two ambiguities, on 
whether ‘the statue’ means the statue or the temporal slice of the statue at t, and on whether 
‘identity across time’ means identity or a genidentity relation. 
6.2 The Order of Explanation 
My argument has largely been negative up to now, but I will now answer Burke’s 
question about the order of explanation, which should then make clear why, pace Burke, there is 
no circularity.  The spatio-temporal distribution of physical properties, together with what it is to 
be a statue, explains whether, and if so exactly where and when, there are statues.  There are two 
reasons why it is somewhat misleading to use the expression ‘the statue’s history’ for the 
distribution of physical properties.  First, the property instantiations that determine when and 
where a statue exists extend outside the spatio-temporal region of the statue — e.g., for there to 
be a statue there must be a person with certain intentions prior to the creation of the statue.  
Second, we are not in fact interested in the properties of the statue, but rather the properties of 
the fundamental particles or space-time points of which the statue is composed.  We might use 
the ungainly, though more accurate description, ‘the spatio-temporal distribution of properties 
underlying the existence of the statue’.  But, as long as our meaning is clear, we can agree with 
Burke that a statue’s history determines that it falls under the sortal ‘statue’ and thus explains 
why it is a statue. 
But what then, asks Burke, explains its history?  Here we have another ambiguity.  If we 
mean by ‘its history’ just what explained the statue’s sort, then Burke is asking what explains the 
fact that there is this particular spatio-temporal distribution of physical properties.  The answer to 
that is easy, at least for our purposes: the initial conditions of the universe together with the laws 
of nature explain why there is this distribution of physical properties. 
But Burke shifts the sense of ‘its history’ and instead appears to be asking why the statue 
traces this particular historical path through space and time.  This, though, is a question we just 
answered.  Given the distribution of physical properties through space and time, and given what 
it is to be a statue, i.e. the identity conditions for statues, this temporal slice will be co-statue-
slice related with those temporal slices, the series of which traces this particular path through 
time.  It may appear that I am appealing to the object’s sort, since I appeal to the conditions for 
being a statue in this explanation; but I appeal to the general conditions for what it is to be a 
statue and not to the fact that this object is a statue or that that slice is a slice of a statue.  The 
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charge of circularity therefore rests upon two equivocations.  If we mean by ‘the object’s history’ 
the spatio-temporal distribution of physical properties, and if we mean by ‘the object’s sort’ the 
fact that the object is a statue, then the statue’s history explains its sort.  If instead we mean by 
‘the object’s history’ the spatio-temporal path the object traces and mean by ‘the object’s sort’ 
the concept or identity conditions for being a statue, then the statue’s sort explains its history.  
But only if we equivocate on both expressions would we think that the explanation is circular. 
7. Conclusion 
The case for monism begins with the natural belief that only one object sits on the 
mantle, that the lump of clay is a statue.  Once we distinguish the temporally and modally 
relative relation of sameness from the relation of absolute identity, we see that these beliefs offer 
no evidence for the absolute identity of the statue and the lump of clay.  The claim that two 
things can’t occupy the same space at the same time; the intuition that a continuous change in an 
object’s shape doesn’t bring into existence an infinitude of new objects; the thought that it would 
be mysterious if two objects exactly shared location, weight, and all other such properties; and 
the idea that two different objects can’t share all the same parts — all such claims fail to 
undermine the pluralist’s thesis that two different objects as individuated by absolute identity can 
occupy the same space at the same time.  Burke offers a temporal supervenience argument, 
claiming that the pluralist cannot account for the sort of an object without giving a circular 
account.  But his argument founders upon the conflation of different notions of ‘cross-time 
identity’ and ‘the statue’.  Is coincidence, then, so strange after all? 
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